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Abstract 
 
In his theoretical model of production prices Marx follows the classical economists in treating 
wages as being paid in advance. Sraffa, instead, tends to treat them as being paid post factum. 
However, when Marx tackles the problem under less abstract scrutiny, he abandons the classical 
approach and declares that, as a matter of fact, wages are postponed. We prove that, if the period of 
postponed wage payment differs from the length of the production process, the correct prices are 
better approximated by an equation with the full post-payment of wages than by one with full pre-
payment. Under perfect competition and postponed wage payments, Sraffa’s approach to price 
determination is the correct one, and validates Marx’s non-classical vision, whatever the period of 
wage payment. 
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ADVANCED OR POSTPONED WAGE PAYMENTS:  
SRAFFA VALIDATES MARX 
 
 
 
When dealing with a capitalist economy, Sraffa (1960, 9-11) determines production 
prices with a formula corresponding to the following equation: 
 
𝒑𝟏 = (1 + 𝑟)𝒑𝟏𝑨 + 𝑤𝒍,                                                                                             (1) 
 
where 𝒑𝟏 is a vector of prices, 𝑨 an indecomposable matrix of technical coefficients, 
𝒍 a vector of labour coefficients, and the scalars 𝑟 and 𝑤 represent the profit and wage 
rates. In equation (1) the wage is treated as being paid post factum. Since it is not paid 
in advance, it is not capitalized. 
   Marx, instead, defines the profit rate 𝑟 = 𝑆/(𝐶 + 𝑉), where 𝑆 = 𝒑𝟐(𝑰 − 𝑨)𝒒 −
𝑤𝒍𝒒, 𝐶 = 𝒑𝟐𝑨𝒒, 𝑉 = 𝑤𝒍𝒒, and 𝒒 is a vector of activity levels. This implies that 
wages are paid in advance and the price equation is: 
 
𝒑𝟐 = (1 + 𝑟)𝒑𝟐𝑨 + (1 + 𝑟)𝑤𝒍.                                                                                 (2) 
 
   On the other hand, he declares unequivocally that in a capitalist economy ‘the 
labourer is not paid until after he has expended his labour power’ (1867-93, I, 567). 
As he observes, despite the common view that ‘the capitalist, using the jargon of 
political economy, advances the capital laid down in wages […,] as a matter of fact 
the reverse takes place. It is the labourer who advances his labour to the capitalist’ 
(1867-93, II, 219). He also thinks that the practice of taking  𝐶 and 𝑉 as a base for 
calculation of the profit rate is the result of a distorted point of view: ‘the whole thing 
amounts to a capitalist quid pro quo, and the advance which the labourer gives to the 
capitalist in labour is turned into an advance of money given to the labourer by the 
capitalist’ (ibid). Finally, he admits that, by adopting the formula 𝑟 = 𝑆/(𝐶 + 𝑉), he 
proceeds ‘according to the usual way of reckoning’ (1867-93, I, 227) and thus 
complies with ‘the jargon of political economy’, i.e. that of the classical economists. 
Sraffa  (1960, 10), instead, makes it clear that he ‘assume[s] that the wage is paid post 
factum […] thus abandoning the classical economists’ idea of a wage “advanced” 
from capital’.1 
                                           
1 When he considers ‘wages as consisting of the necessary subsistence of the workers’, Sraﬀa treats them ‘on the same 
footing as the fuel for the engines or the feed for the cattle’ (1960, 9). However, when he comes to ‘consider the 
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   What are the reasons for the quid pro quo? One might be that equation (2) 
represents the usual practice of price fixing followed by firms: normal prices are 
determined by applying a gross markup to variable costs (𝐶 + 𝑉). Then equation (2) 
holds independently of whether wages are advanced or postponed, but simply 
because it corresponds to the procedure by which firms fix prices. Price fixing by the 
firms, however, implies that markets are not fully competitive. If perfect competition 
is assumed – as done by Marx, following Smith and Ricardo – market prices are not 
fixed by firms, but are determined by the forces of demand and supply. If the market 
process is stable, and wages are postponed, market prices must gravitate around the 
production prices represented by equation (1), not equation (2). 
   Another reason for the quid pro quo could be that in many sectors (e.g. agriculture) 
the length of the production process (one year) is longer than the length of the sub-
period for wage payment (a week or a month). Therefore, even if paid at the end of 
the week or the month, wages are advanced by capitalists during the production 
process and thence must be capitalized at the end of the year. This observation, 
however, does not justify equation (2). 
   In fact, suppose the annual wage, 𝑤, is post-paid in 𝑡 sub-period instalments during 
the production process, the length of the wage payment sub-period being 1/𝑡 of the 
length of the production process. The sub-period wage is 𝑤/𝑡. The annual factor of 
profit is 1 + 𝑟 = (1 + 𝑖)𝑡, where 𝑖 is the sub-period rate of interest. As shown by 
Steedman (1977, 103-4), prices are determined as: 
  
𝒑𝟑 = (1 + 𝑟)𝒑𝟑𝑨 + [1 + (1 + 𝑖) + ⋯ (1 + 𝑖)𝑡−1] 𝑤𝑡 𝒍.                                                     
 
Since [1 + (1 + 𝑖) + ⋯ (1 + 𝑖)𝑡−1] = (1+𝑖)𝑡−1
𝑖
= 𝑟
𝑖
 , 
 
𝒑𝟑 = (1 + 𝑟)𝒑𝟑𝑨 + 𝑟𝑖𝑡 𝑤𝒍.                                                                                          (3) 
 
which is equal to (1) when 𝑡=1. Now, a real economy involves production processes 
of different lengths. Some of them are longer than the wage payment period, while 
others are shorter. In abstract theory, this difficulty is overcome by assuming that all 
production processes, as well as the wage payment period, have the same length. 
Then, the question is whether (1) or (2) is more plausible in this idealized economy.2 
The answer is: the most plausible is the one that better approximates equation (3).  
   Steedman (1977, 105) proves that (1) gives a good approximation for low profit 
rates. The degree of approximation weakens when 𝑟 rises. Steedman’s result can be 
generalized. We prove that equation (1) always yields a better approximation than 
                                                                                                                                           
division of the surplus between capitalists and workers’ (ib.) and, more generally, when he treats wages as a variable 
‘share of the annual product’ (ib., 10), he assumes they are postponed. 
2 Sraffa (1960, 10) does not raise this question. He just assumes that all the production processes and the wage payment 
period last one year. 
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(2). Meanwhile, let us show in figure 1 the behaviour of 𝑟/𝑖𝑡 and 1+𝑟 for 𝑡=12 and 
𝑖∈[0.001, 0.1]. It is evident that (1+𝑟)−𝑟/𝑖𝑡 > 𝑟/𝑖𝑡−1, which is the condition under 
which the full wage post-payment equation yields a better approximation than the full 
wage pre-payment equation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
More generally, we prove in the appendix that  
 
𝑥𝑡(𝑖): = �(1 + 𝑟) − 𝑟𝑖𝑡� − �𝑟𝑖𝑡 − 1� = (1 + 𝑖)𝑡 − 2 (1+𝑖)𝑡−1𝑖𝑡 + 1 > 0,   ∀𝑡 > 0, ∀𝑖 > 0. 
 
The behaviour of 𝑥𝑡(𝑖), for 𝑡 = 12 and 𝑡 = 52, is shown in figure 2. 
 
 
 
Figure 2 
 
 
Appendix 
 
PROPOSITION: for every positive 𝑖 and every positive 𝑡, 
 (1 + 𝑖)𝑡 − 2 (1+𝑖)𝑡−1
𝑖𝑡
+ 1 > 0. 
PROOF: the relation  (1 + 𝑖)𝑡 − 2 (1+𝑖)𝑡−1
𝑖𝑡
+ 1 > 0 can be rewritten as 
0
0,5
1
1,5
2
2,5
3
3,5
i 
 1+r 
  r/it 
                          Figure 1 
4 
 
 �1 − 2
𝑖𝑡
� (1 + 𝑖)𝑡 + �1 + 2
𝑖𝑡
� > 0,              (a1) 
which is trivially true if 𝑖𝑡 ≥ 2.  
If 0 < 𝑖𝑡 < 2, the quantity �1 − 2
𝑖𝑡
� is negative, thus (a1) is equivalent to  
 (1 + 𝑖)𝑡 < −1+2𝑖𝑡
1−
2
𝑖𝑡
 , 
or 
 (1 + 𝑖)𝑡 < 2+𝑖𝑡
2−𝑖𝑡
 .                 (a2) 
In lemma 3 we prove (a2) for every positive 𝑖 and 0 < 𝑡 < 2
𝑖
 . 
Lemma 3 uses the relation 
�1 − 𝑖𝑡
2
�
2 (1 + 𝑖)𝑡 < 1, 
which is proved in lemma 2.  
This uses the relation 
𝑖2
4
ln(1 + 𝑖) 𝑡2 − 𝑖 �ln(1 + 𝑖) − 𝑖
2
� 𝑡 + ln(1 + 𝑖) − 𝑖 < 0, 
which is proved in lemma 1. 
 
LEMMA 1: for every positive 𝑖, if 0 < 𝑡 < 2
𝑖
 , 
 𝑖
2
4
ln(1 + 𝑖) 𝑡2 − 𝑖 �ln(1 + 𝑖) − 𝑖
2
� 𝑡 + ln(1 + 𝑖) − 𝑖 < 0.            (a3) 
PROOF: consider the parabola with equation: 
 𝑦𝑖(𝑡) = 𝑖24 ln(1 + 𝑖) 𝑡2 − 𝑖 �ln(1 + 𝑖) − 𝑖2� 𝑡 + ln(1 + 𝑖) − 𝑖, 
which is convex since 𝑖
2
4
ln(1 + 𝑖) > 0. It is  
 𝑦𝑖(0) = ln(1 + 𝑖) − 𝑖 < 0  
or 0 < ln(1 + 𝑖) < 𝑖.  
Moreover 
 𝑦𝑖 �
2
𝑖
� = 𝑖2
4
ln(1 + 𝑖) 4
𝑖2
− 𝑖 �ln(1 + 𝑖) − 𝑖
2
�
2
𝑖
+ ln(1 + 𝑖) − 𝑖 
    = ln(1 + 𝑖) − 2ln(1 + 𝑖) + 𝑖 + ln(1 + 𝑖) − 𝑖 = 0. (a3) follows from non-positivity at the extremes and convexity of the parabola.∎ 
 
LEMMA 2: for every positive 𝑖, if 0 < 𝑡 < 2
𝑖
 , 
�1 − 𝑖𝑡
2
�
2 (1 + 𝑖)𝑡 < 1.                (a4) 
PROOF: put 𝑔𝑖(𝑡) = �1 − 𝑖𝑡2�2 (1 + 𝑖)𝑡, and take the derivative: 
 𝑔𝑖′(𝑡) = 2 �1 − 𝑖𝑡2� �− 𝑖2� (1 + 𝑖)𝑡 + �1 − 𝑖𝑡2�2 (1 + 𝑖)𝑡 ln(1 + 𝑖) 
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  = �𝑖2𝑡
2
− 𝑖� (1 + 𝑖)𝑡 + �1 − 𝑖𝑡 + 𝑖2𝑡2
4
� (1 + 𝑖)𝑡 ln(1 + 𝑖) 
  = �𝑖2
4
ln(1 + 𝑖) 𝑡2 − 𝑖 �ln(1 + 𝑖) − 𝑖
2
� 𝑡 + ln(1 + 𝑖) − 𝑖� (1 + 𝑖)𝑡. 
By (a3) 𝑔𝑖′(𝑡) < 0 for every 𝑡 between 0 and  2𝑖  . (a4) follows from this and from lim𝑡→0+ 𝑔𝑖(𝑡) = 1. ∎ 
 
LEMMA 3: for every positive 𝑖, if 0 < 𝑡 < 2
𝑖
, (a2) is true. 
PROOF: by (a4) and relation 0 < ln(1 + 𝑖) < 𝑖, 
 (1 + 𝑖)𝑡 ln(1 + 𝑖) < 1
�1−
𝑖𝑡
2
�
2  𝑖, 
or 
 (1 + 𝑖)𝑡 ln(1 + 𝑖) < 4𝑖(2−𝑖𝑡)2  . 
From the isotonic property of integrals we know that, if 0 < 𝑡 < 2
𝑖
, 
 ∫ (1 + 𝑖)𝑢 ln(1 + 𝑖)𝑡0 𝑑𝑑 < ∫ 4𝑖(2−𝑖𝑢)2𝑡0 𝑑𝑑. 
This is equivalent to  
 ∫ 𝑑 ((1 + 𝑖)𝑢)𝑡0 < ∫ 𝑑 � 42−𝑖𝑢�𝑡0 , 
which, after integration, yields 
 (1 + 𝑖)𝑡 − 1 < 4
2−𝑖𝑡
− 2, 
equivalent to (a2). ∎ 
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